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Hurricane Katrina changed the way the United States conducts domestic disaster relief, 
most notably with the expanded role of the U.S. military. This thesis centers on the 
question: To what extent should the military be involved in domestic humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief? Analysis of mistakes from Katrina point to the answer: The 
U.S. military should not hold a primary role in disaster relief due to the issues of 
establishing logistic, communication and medical networks for the victims of a disaster. 
Instead, a shift in policy should be made to use America’s private sector resources to 
conduct disaster relief efforts. The autonomous nature of private sector leadership allows 
for quick decisions and front-line empowerment to establish centers of relief to distribute 
food, shelter, water and medical supplies as well as support communications and logistic 
efforts. Because of these attributes, the private sector is better equipped than the military 
to handle domestic disaster relief, and a change in policy should be made to reflect this. 
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In past disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, private companies’ offers of disaster 
relief were dismissed as inferior to the resources of the U.S. government, which was 
perhaps self-serving, given that these companies are seen as solely profit driven. 
Institutional differences, such as the managerial hierarchy, organization, resources, and 
cost of mobilizing these resources seemed to make any meaningful cooperation between 
the U.S. military and private companies impossible—and probably even undesirable. The 
question is no longer whether private companies can assist in disaster relief, but rather 
how the U.S. government can work alongside these private companies to make disaster 
relief more efficient and reliable. 
Many issues that arise from disaster preparedness and response come from the 
lack of clarity about which entity is providing what service and which has priority. 
The problems in communication and coordination are only exacerbated in the chaos 
of actual, on-the-ground disaster relief. In this fast-changing and often unclear 
situation, both the peril and the promise of the public-private approach arise. On the 
one hand, more operators to train and supervise sounds like more trouble at a time and 
place that can ill afford it. On the other hand, private companies that are, for example, 
well versed in shipping, building, food preparation, and first aid could provide the 
quickest response and allow the military to focus on search-and-rescue needs and 
possibly law enforcement tasks. 
For the U.S. military to work with the private sector efficiently, strict roles need 
to be defined for both. For example, the military could provide the search-and-rescue 
teams as well as some of the law enforcement personnel (if resources in manpower are 
lacking), while the private companies on the ground could provide the logistics support to 
survivors of the disaster. Such cooperation would lead to increased efficiency throughout 
the operation and would allow the survivors to get the aid they needed in a timely 
fashion. 
 2 
Since the military has been drawing down its operations overseas and scaling 
back forward presence, it has the opportunity to make the homeland more secure against 
both terrorist attacks and natural disasters. This drawing down of forces also marks an 
opportunity to expand the traditional model of “military driven” disaster response to 
include private companies that offer help in times of need.  
However, in order to make these revisions to the relationship between the military 
and the private sector succeed, the legal framework must be reconsidered and, most 
likely, amended. Currently, the Posse Comitatus Act 1981 (PCA) forbids the president 
from using Title 10 troops as law enforcement officers in the civilian sector, a significant 
limitation on the range of roles that uniformed federal troops can play in disaster relief. 
The Stafford Act 1988, which establishes the ground rules by which the federal 
government takes the lead in coordinating disaster relief efforts, forms a partial (and 
temporary) exception in that it allows the governor of a stricken state to request from the 
president Title 10 troops to be placed under the command of the National Guard and used 
in certain defined law enforcement roles. The addition of private companies to this group 
of responders would add another aspect that neither the PCA nor the Stafford Act 
mentions. Could the governor of the state ask private companies to provide law 
enforcement officers? How would any private-sector aid be integrated into the Stafford 
Act system? What are the legal and practical implications of a military commander 
issuing orders to a private-sector relief worker? This confusion is why the PCA and 
certainly the Stafford Act would need to be amended to allow private companies to 
become involved in disaster relief alongside the military.  
This shift to private-public disaster relief is inevitable due to overtasking and 
underfunding of the U.S. military, which creates a gap that private entities can fill. The 
transition needs some careful consideration, however, to ensure that Americans can count 
on the most effective disaster relief. Understanding how to train and teach not only 
government officials but also the average citizen how to proceed with first response 
during a crisis, and what public and private corporations can bring to the fight as far as 
logistics and supplies, is vital to making the private-public relationship work. The U.S. 
 3 
military may not have a lead role in all disaster-relief operations going forward, but it can 
and should be central in the planning and implementation of the transition to the public-
private approach.  
  
 4 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 5 
II. HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE FAILED RESPONSE OF 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans, and the military was called in to 
provide disaster relief: that relief showed up four days later? While the city of New 
Orleans was waiting for the government to provide aid, the private sector in Louisiana 
and surrounding states was already offering to help the government with the process in 
the form of food, shelter, water, and other necessities. For a variety of legal, practical, 
organizational and historical reasons, however, federal responders, particularly the 
military, were unable to make much use of these offers—to the glaring detriment of the 
people who needed assistance most. Ultimately, the lack of organization within the 
government response created issues within the chain of command, and these issues meant 
the resources of the private companies were turned away. Had the government allowed 
the military to work with the private companies and coordinate resources, more aid would 
have come more quickly to the Katrina victims, saving time, money, and most 
importantly, lives.  
This chapter will outline the preparations that were made by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), 
their execution and the flaws of them, what resources the private sector was able to 
provide, what the military did and did not do, and the policy changes that came as a result 
of the Katrina event. Throughout this chapter, the policy failures and successes of 
government agencies will be examined.  
A. PREPARATIONS AND EXECUTION 
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast of the United States with more 
force than any hurricane recorded before it, causing more than $108 billion worth of 
damage1 in just two days.  
                                                 
1 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report (Miami, FL: 
National Hurricane Center, 2005). 
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Two weeks before the landfall of Hurricane Katrina, the commander of Northern 
Command (NORTHCOM), who is responsible for leading the military preparation and 
response to natural disasters, received word that a tropical depression was building off the 
coast of Cuba, and it was gaining strength.2 With this assessment, NORTHCOM was 
ordered to make preparations for landfall. During the prior two weeks, the Army Corps of 
Engineers was ordered to New Orleans to assess the levee system and whether it could 
maintain structural integrity during a storm surge. Supplies of food and water were 
stockpiled and ready to be distributed, medical preparations were made, and evacuation 
routes were planned.  
On August 23, 2005, Hurricane Katrina, a category four hurricane with sustained 
wind speeds of 150 miles per hour, made direct impact in the middle of New Orleans. 
The levee system subsequently failed, allowing millions of gallons of water to flow into 
downtown New Orleans. Wind tore roofs from houses and sent debris flying into the air, 
and people were trapped in their houses with no place to go and no sign of rescue. When 
Katrina finally dissipated on August 30, NORTHCOM gave the order to execute the 
plans regarding stockpiled supplies, medical prep, evacuation and shelter.3  
As Hurricane Katrina dissipated, the National Response Plan (NRP), which was 
created by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), was invoked for the 
devastated areas. By law, this plan allows the direction of disaster management to fall 
under one person; in this case, it was the director of FEMA, Michael Brown. In order for 
the NRP to work, there must be communication between first responders and their 
dispatch center in order for actions to take place. The NRP states, “Emergency Support 
Function (ESF) #2: Communications ensures the provision of Federal communications 
support to Federal, State, local, tribal, and private-sector response efforts during an 
Incident of National Significance.”4 This is a common-sense approach to the dispatch of 
first responders to assist victims; however, if all communication pipelines are destroyed, 
                                                 
2 Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still 
Unprepared, H.R. Rep. No. 107-322, (2006). 
3 Ibid. 
4 The Air University, “Emergency Support Function #2-Communications Annex,” December 2004, 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nrp/esf02.pdf, ESF #2-1.  
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it is difficult for emergency responders to locate the affected areas that need assistance. 
This was the case in New Orleans. In addition to this problem, lines of communications 
were severed, leaving people without ways to call for help or get in contact with dispatch 
centers.  
During the first 20 hours of the aftermath, National Guard troops were activated 
in the state of Louisiana. However, 80 percent of the Louisiana National Guard had been 
activated under Title 10 as federal troops in the U.S. Army serving in Iraq, leaving 
Louisiana to depend on their neighbors in Mississippi and Alabama to provide needed 
troops.5  
B. FEMA’S ROLE IN THE DISASTER 
Since 1978, FEMA has been a tool for U.S. presidents to call on when small 
issues turn into larger disasters. In the mid-1990s, FEMA was considered by most 
Americans to be the premier disaster management agency in the world due to its ability to 
conduct operations in an efficient and professional manner.6 During the Clinton 
administration, James Lee Witt, who had served on Clinton’s gubernatorial staff in 
Arkansas, led FEMA. Arguably, Clinton named Witt the leader of FEMA not only 
because he was a personal friend, but also because Witt had been an emergency manager 
and elected official in Arkansas. FEMA, under Witt, became a largely proactive 
organization that worked with local agencies to ensure that the local governments were 
prepared for disasters.7 However, during the Bush administration, FEMA was folded into 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and was no longer autonomous. Moreover, 
the agency was led by Michael Brown, a man who had no experience in disaster 
management and allowed the once-thriving agency to become reactive rather proactive. 
                                                 
5 Keith Bea and Richard Sylves, Emergency Management: The American Experience 1900–2010, ed. 
Claire B. Rubin, 1st ed., vol. 2 (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2012), 289. 
6 Ibid., 167. 
7 Ibid. 
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This added to the many problems it already had with communication among other 
agencies.8  
As New Orleans and the surrounding areas emerged from the disaster of 
Hurricane Katrina, the main question that surfaced was, “Why was the response from 
FEMA so confusing and slow during the crisis?” This question plagued former FEMA 
director Brown during the special congressional hearing after the disaster.  
Prior to the September 11 attacks, FEMA had been its own separate entity with 
direct access to the executive branch. This access allowed FEMA to get the answers it 
needed immediately, and, in turn, gave it the autonomy to make decisions in disasters that 
could save lives. After the attacks, FEMA was absorbed into DHS and acquired a new set 
of chain-of-command issues. This refocusing diverted FEMA’s efforts away from 
disaster management and more toward prevention and response to homeland attacks. It 
also involved the replacement of FEMA employees who had the experience needed to 
deal with disasters, and FEMA was no longer a proactive agency that led prevention and 
preparedness programs to maintain the United States’ readiness for disaster. These 
changes in the way FEMA conducted its business played a direct part in the failing 
response that occurred in New Orleans. 
Politics have affected FEMA ever since the founding of the agency in the 1950s.9 
As mentioned before, during the Clinton administration, President Clinton appointed 
James Witt to the office of director of FEMA due to his expertise in the field of 
emergency management. Due to Witt’s experience, he was able to mold the agency into a 
well-functioning machine that worked well with other organizations to ensure the highest 
readiness possible for the local governments of individual states.10 During the President 
George W. Bush’s administration, it was the exact opposite. However, the people in 
charge of the agency were not completely to blame. The state and local government did 
not make needed preparations to deal with a storm of this magnitude in the proper 
                                                 
8 Brett Arends, “Brown Pushed from Last Job: Horse Group: FEMA Chief Had to Be ‘Asked to 
Resign,’” Boston Herald, September 3, 2005, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article10115.htm.  
9 Bea and Sylves, Emergency Management: The American Experience 1900–2010, 289. 
10 Ibid. 
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amount of time. These issues will be dealt with in a later chapter. All of these issues led 
to Hurricane Katrina becoming the most deadly and devastating disaster to strike the 
United States since Hurricane Andrew in 1992. 
C. WHAT THE MILITARY DID AND DID NOT DO 
Most Americans view the military as a vast organization that can perform the 
tasks that no other agency can handle. These tasks include waging war, homeland 
security, and even disaster relief. However, what happens when these resources and 
assets are not available or late to deploy to an area? What happens during a disaster of 
such magnitude, such as Hurricane Katrina, to the people of the affected area? This 
question of why the military responded so slowly to the disaster and what the 
organization did and did not do is what government officials have been asking since 
Hurricane Katrina ravaged the coast.  
In 1985, during the Reagan Administration the military had the greatest amount of 
resources to allocate for disaster relief.11 That was nearly 30 years ago. Now with 
advances in technology and logistic capabilities using some of the major players of the 
business world, the military can almost be surpassed in resources and abilities to deploy 
the supplies needed to assist in disaster relief. A report generated by the Pentagon in 1996 
acknowledged that the DOD (Department of Defense) would commit “Hurricane 
Andrew-level” resources to all catastrophic events.12 However, in 2005, after Hurricane 
Katrina, this commitment went unrealized.  
Once Katrina dissipated, President Bush and FEMA declared a state of emergency 
and ordered the military mobilized (mainly the 82nd Airborne). Nothing happened for 
three days. This lack of action was not completely the military’s fault due to the chain of 
command preventing them to do anything without the order of the president. It has been 
said that FEMA and the executive branch have all the authority, but it lacked leadership, 
and the leadership failed to pull the trigger due to the possibility of blame being placed on 
                                                 
11 Drew Brown, Seth Borenstein, and Alison Young, “Key Military Help for Victims of Hurricane 
Katrina was Delayed,” September 17, 2005, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/0917-05.htm.  
12 Ibid. 
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one agency or entity. Once the military was in the disaster zone, the communication and 
the logistics were hindered for days after the initial response due to bickering among 
internal parts of the local government of Louisiana, organizations at the federal level not 
communicating with one another and FEMA wanting to coordinate all the relief efforts.13 
However, once the military was deployed, they were able to send swift water teams to 
provide search and rescue capabilities, helicopters to do the same, the Army Corps of 
Engineers were sent to repair the levee system, and the public works division under the 
National Response Plan (NRP) to begin contracting with other agencies for water, ice and 
other perishables for the survivors.14 Figures 1 and 2 show the assets that were given to 
New Orleans from the surrounding areas and the build-up of military forces once 
deployed into the disaster zone. 
 
Figure 1.  Flow of Military Forces to Mississippi and Louisiana in 200515  
                                                 
13 Lynn Davis, Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations, vol. 1 (Santa Monica, 





Figure 2.  Buildup of Army Active-Duty Units in Louisiana (2005)16  
What caused the delay in deployment? The governor of Louisiana, Kathleen 
Blanco, wrote a letter to the president regarding the severity of the storm and the need for 
supplemental civilian resources but never mentioned the need for DOD assets.17 
According to a U.S. Senate report on Hurricane Katrina, Blanco stated, “preparations for 
Hurricane Katrina did not include efforts on the part of either FEMA or DHS leadership 
to engage DOD to learn what specific capabilities it might be able to provide in advance 
of hurricane landfall, or to seek to call upon DOD support capabilities.”18 The governor 
added that 40,000 federal troops with vehicles would be needed to support the disaster 
relief effort and reiterated that point on September 3 in a meeting with President Bush.19 
                                                 
16 Davis, Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations, 3. 
17 Ibid. 




D. WHAT DID PRIVATE INDUSTRY OFFER? 
After Hurricane Katrina subsided, Congress asked the question, “How were the 
private companies able to get the aid that was needed into the disaster zone so quickly 
when the government was not?”20 The answer appeared simple: Private companies were 
able to respond quickly because instead of focusing on a central command structure they 
were able to operate on a fractured chain of command and focus on a common goal. 
Another aspect that allowed the response to be so quick was that companies, such as Wal-
Mart and Home Depot had studied the disasters of the past and prepared to respond to 
another eventual catastrophe. One of the most important aspects of this effort was the 
preplanning of resources. These companies knew that there were going to be 
complications with the response process, such as communication failures and getting the 
supplies to victims. Most importantly, these companies gave the power to the leaders of 
those businesses to make the decisions about when to send the supplies in and where to 
put them.21  
The private sector focused on four main areas during the disaster: retail, 
hospitality, power, and technology.22 During the aftermath of Katrina, companies, such 
as Home Depot and Wal-Mart used their resources to set up distribution points for food, 
water, and clothing. Starwood Hotels, which operates three hotels in New Orleans, 
opened its doors and gave shelter to those in need as soon as the storm passed, which, in 
turn, allowed the hotel company to regain its foothold in the area much quicker. The 
Mississippi Power Company was able to restore most of the electricity to customers, 
decisions the company was able to make because of the leadership’s autonomy.23 Finally, 
IBM (International Business Machines) saw that re-establishing communications was 
going to be essential for the disaster relief operation to continue and was able to 
                                                 
20 Hurricane Katrina: What Can the Government Learn from the Private Sector’s Response? 109th 





coordinate with the companies and agencies on the ground much more efficiently than 
the government did.24  
The Senate Hearing Committee wanted to know how these companies did all of 
this in such a short amount of time. All four of the companies that testified in front of 
Congress said preplanning, lessons learned from previous storms, and front-line 
empowerment allowed them to respond as they did.25 These significant changes on the 
part of the companies in the private sector allowed them to make decisions in the field 
without having to channel those decisions through another agency in order to have them 
approved. Another example of forward thinking on the part of the Mississippi Power 
Company was that it embedded an ambassador of sorts in FEMA. This allowed the 
company to personally interact with FEMA and granted the company the autonomy to get 
done what needed to get done without having the supplies they had on site be confiscated 
by FEMA.  
Finally, one trait every company shared that allowed them to be successful was 
communication resources; not just the ability to make and receive calls, but the ability to 
understand what to do if the communication was cut off. These communications 
strategies were placed into training plans, and those plans were executed during the 
hurricane. At the issue of a hurricane warning, the Starwood Hotels set up a command 
center that communicated daily with each other to ensure everyone knew what was going 
on with the other, hotlines were set up for the guests of those hotels, the emergency 
generators were checked and rechecked, and the hotels made sure that they had enough 
food and water on hand for five days with 1,000 guests.26 These autonomous or semi-
autonomous chains of command and remarkable communication allowed private 
companies to take the upper hand in the disaster relief process and save thousands of 
lives because of their preplanning.  
                                                 




E. POLICY CHANGES FROM KATRINA 
Hurricane Katrina prompted policy makers to examine the guidelines in place that 
pertained to how FEMA was organized and run. A major problem was the 
communication and leadership within the agency. Congress found that the leadership 
before, during, and after the crisis was not merely lacking but virtually non-existent due 
to the reactive nature of FEMA. Because of these and other problems within the agency, 
Congress made major changes. Among these changes, which went into effect in 2007, 
Congress established that the administrator of FEMA must meet certain prerequisites to 
hold the office: “The Administrator is to be appointed by the President from among 
individuals who have ... a demonstrated ability in and knowledge of emergency 
management and homeland security; and ... not less than five years of executive 
leadership and management experience in the public or private sector.”27 
Now, FEMA is a semi-separate entity that remains under DHS but does not 
answer directly to the secretary of Homeland Security. FEMA now has more autonomy, 
allowing the agency to make recommendation on crisis management directly to Congress 
once the Secretary of DHS has been informed.28 The Post-Katrina Act (2006) added 13 
responsibilities to those originally set out for FEMA in the Homeland Security Act 
(HSA). These responsibilities included, “ensuring first responder effectiveness, 
supervising grants, administering and implementing the National Response Plan, 
preparing and implementing federal continuity of government and operations plans and 
maintaining and operating the response coordination center, among others. While 
implementation of these activities and responsibilities is to build ‘common capabilities’ 
that will enable the agency to address all hazards through a risk-based management 
system, the statute also calls for the development of ‘unique capabilities’ that would be 
needed for events that pose the greatest risk to the nation.”29  
                                                 
27 Hurricane Katrina: What Can the Government Learn from the Private Sector’s Response? 
28 Keith Bea, Federal Emergency Management Policy Changes After Hurricane Katrina: A Summary 
of Statutory Provision, CRS Report RL33729 (Washington, DC, Library of Congress, Congressional 
Research Service, March 6, 2007), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33729.pdf. 
29 Ibid. 
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FEMA now has many units with various missions. These units are charged with 
creating regional centers that are responsible for training the regions in disaster 
preparedness, fostering mutual aid within the region, and implementing of the National 
Response Plan (NRP).30 This has been a major change in the previous policy now 
focusing on bottom-up proactive preparation.  
A policy change that occurred post-Katrina was the creation of a “Surge Capable 
Force”31 This force would be comprised of FEMA and DHS employees who have the 
ability and the training to manage, lead, train, and deploy to an area of disaster and begin 
relief efforts. These individuals are required to continually receive training in order to 
keep themselves current and ready to respond to any disaster. The personnel who serve 
on this force are not counted against the agency’s personnel ceiling and will continue to 
serve in their normal jobs outside of the force.  
After Hurricane Katrina, the government has been making changes to the policy 
of emergency management and disaster preparedness in order to make it more efficient 
and safe. There have been major breakthroughs, such as the addition of a surge force, the 
separation of FEMA from directly reporting to the secretary of DHS, the implementation 
of the National Response Plan (NRP), and the shift from being a reactive agency to a 
proactive one.  
Not enough is being done in order to ensure that when a major catastrophe, such 
as Katrina, occurs again, that the American people will be ready due to the massive chain 
of command FEMA and the first responders have to go through in order to get anything 
done. Training is a good thing and so is being educated on the possible dangers. 
However, if something goes wrong in the field that is not in the manual of how to deal 
with that particular issue, what do they do then? When people train they focus too much 
on the manual. This is not to say that looking and reading the manual is not a good thing, 
quite the contrary. But when people become so integrated in the playbook and things do 
not go exactly as planned, that is when people panic and forget the training and then they 
                                                 




cannot adapt to the situation. More has to be done to ensure that these leaders and 
managers can make calls on their own and then deal with the repercussions after the 
decision has been made, thus saving precious time and lives in the field.  
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III. THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN DISASTER RESPONSE AND 
ASSOCIATED ISSUES 
Understanding whether the use of federal troops in disaster relief is beneficial 
policy makers must examine why government entities want them involved in the process. 
Supporters of the use of military assets give numerous reasons why they are effective and 
needed. One common reason is the realization that assisting in disaster relief can improve 
the military’s public image and provide real-time training experience for the troops.32 In 
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, President Bush asked that the military have a more 
direct involvement in the relief process.33 Another reason is many humanitarian aid 
agencies are stretched thin, and the military can provide the bridge in the gap for 
manpower.34 Additionally, military in disaster zones bring a unique set of skills to the 
front that most local government agencies do not have.35 An unnamed emergency 
manager from FEMA stated, “From Andrew on, I’ve believed there is a civilian mission 
for the military; we needed what they uniquely could provide in Andrew, and it was 
needed again in Katrina.”36 The Pentagon believes that use of federal troops is critical to 
disaster relief efforts and created a 20,000 troop National Natural Disaster Response 
Team, spending $556 million dollars in a five-year training program.37 
After President Bush suggested that the military should have command of 
operations in a disaster,38 the nation’s governors were quick to note that although the 
federal government does have impressive resources, they do not want the government 
taking over. Indeed, the governor of Michigan, when asked if the military should take 
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over, responded, “Hell no.”39 Jurisdiction, federalism, and gubernatorial prestige all 
figure into such responses. Moreover, there is a view that the military lacks the response 
capability. As National Guard Colonel Kenneth E. Ring stated at the Pennsylvania War 
College, “The army lacks a clear, effective, and coordinated response capability.”40 Ring 
made this statement in reference to the chain of command issues that are created during a 
natural disaster.  
Supporters and opponents of greater military involvement agree that the military 
does have the advantage of its size and its equipment with the vast amount of training and 
the ability to adapt to different situations. This ever-evolving role of the military and its 
need in some way for disaster relief can be seen in statements, such as the one given by 
Laura Hudson in 2008: 
Given the growing involvement of military actors in relief activities, 
humanitarian organizations have an opportunity and, some argue, a 
responsibility to engage more strategically with the military in order to 
limit the risks inherent in their involvement and maximize the potential 
benefits to the disaster response system and affected populations. The 
question for humanitarian organizations is no longer whether to engage 
with the military, but rather how and when to do so.41 
A. DOES TIMING HINDER THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO FULLY 
COMMIT THE RESOURCES?  
Timing plays a significant role in determining whether the U.S. government can 
commit the resources needed in a Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief (HADR) 
situation. The placement of supplies before a disaster strikes is where timing is crucial 
and the slightest misstep or delay in these supplies can create costly situations and 
unnecessary casualties. A document from the White House under President George W. 
Bush commented on the joint use of military and National Guard troops in relation to the 
ability to commit to the problem and work together in order to solve the issues. It stated,  
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In the overall response to Hurricane Katrina, separate command structures 
for active duty military and the National Guard hindered their unity of 
effort. U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) commanded active 
duty forces, while each State government commanded its National Guard 
forces. For the first two days of Katrina response operations, 
USNORTHCOM did not have situational awareness of what forces the 
National Guard had on the ground...Neither the Louisiana National Guard 
nor JTF-Katrina had a good sense for where each other’s forces were 
located or what they were doing.42  
This statement shows that even though the military has an abundance of 
resources, if there is no central command in the field and the idea of “let the DOD take 
care of it” prevails; disaster relief will begin to do more harm than good in the long run. 
When the government put federal assets in the form of Title 10 troops on the 
ground with the mentality they were going to lead the HADR, this truly hindered the 
forces from the start. Lack of communication between the two agencies (National Guard 
and Title 10), and lack of communication with private companies put the military in a 
state of confusion. During Hurricane Katrina, the United States had engaged many of its 
resources in Operation Enduring Freedom, and the United States had logistic issues and 
lack of manpower due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Without the numbers, the 
government needed and the equipment that was needed due to it being overseas, the 
military showed up and attempted to do more with less and failed.43 This is where the 
private companies came in and began establishing ways to communicate with people in 
the disaster area. Trying to accomplish more than the task force can handle—search and 
rescue, logistics problems, medical center development, shelter building, and 
communication issues hindered what could have been a successful operation in the short 
term. 
                                                 




B. HOW DOES DEFENSE OF THE HOMELAND HAVE AN EFFECT ON 
HADR? 
Since 2001 and the September 11 attacks, the attention of DHS has shifted from 
an overall defense strategy to a focus on countering terrorism and how terrorism has an 
effect on the infrastructure of the United States. This radical shift and precise focus on 
terrorism has left a massive gap in the preparedness of the United States for natural 
disasters. This is not to say that the U.S. has completely discarded the need to be prepared 
for disasters, but the policies that are being shaped today focus more on the combat and 
recovery from a terrorist attack on the homeland.  
A document released in 2013, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense 
Support for Civil Authorities, noted four key statements for the defense of the 
homeland.44  
There is only one instance in the standing guidance that deals directly with 
preparedness for a natural disaster and that are covered in Presidential Policy Directive-8 
National Preparedness (PPD-8). The rest of the guidelines focus on how to deal with 
terror attacks on the homeland. 
The shift in policy from a preparedness stand point for ALL disasters, not just 
man-made catastrophes, has placed a strain on the emergency community in the form of 
money restraints, equipment shortages, and manpower issues. The focus on terrorism 
within the United States has created a policy where at any time the government believes 
that the primary mission of the armed forces (defense of the homeland) is jeopardized; 
any resources in the area conducting HADR (Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief) 
can be pulled from the disaster zone and redeployed. This statement makes it extremely 
difficult for a local government to depend on the commitment of the federal government 
if they can pull assets at any time to deal with another issue, leaving the private 
companies and the National Guard with very little resources to get the job done.  
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C. ISSUES ORIGINATING WITH THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE CHAIN OF 
COMMAND 
When the military puts soldiers on the ground, it provides a unified force under 
one leader rather than having multiple units trying to accomplish the same thing with 
different methods. The National Guard presents a similar issue. If it is in a disaster area, 
guard members serve their own commanders. This creates a schism in the ability for one 
commander to control the entire area without having orders countermanded due to the 
presence of another commander that does not fall under Title 10. In the private sector, 
however, this is not usually the case. There is an established chain of command within a 
business, but there does not seem to be an “operational” chain of command except in the 
case of local stores. The private sector has a single goal and that goal is what they strive 
to accomplish. This lack of overarching command could place the private sector in a 
better position to deal with HADR in certain areas than the military. 
According to Bill Jenkins, director of the Homeland Security and Justice Issues 
Group, in all emergencies, first responders from the state are responsible. After that, it 
becomes a federal problem.45 Many employees at government agencies say that the most 
important things in the disaster relief realm are the solid relationships among the people 
who are called to work together during times of high stress. Former spokesman for the 
New York Office of Emergency Management, Jarrod Bernstein, stated, “You don’t want 
to meet someone for the first time while you’re standing around in the rubble. You want 
to meet them during drills and exercises.”46 These examples illustrate the importance of 
having a solid chain of command with people who communicate with one another during 
times of crisis. It is also a good example of how this lack of communication and lack of 
clear chain of command with FEMA caused massive failure during Hurricane Katrina.  
After Hurricane Katrina, the government turned its attention to the issues with the 
chain of command once Title 10 federal troops were called in addition to National Guard 
troops. Congress began to look for ways to solve this problem of unification between two 
services. This solution took shape in 2004 when Congress amended the National Defense 
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Authorization Act, permitting National Guard commanders to retain their state 
commissions after being ordered to active duty.47 This allowed a National Guard officer 
to command both Title 10 and Title 32 troops, by utilizing the parallel command of the 
dual-status command. Parallel command does not allow for one commander to have 
control of both the National Guard and the federal military simultaneously but uses two 
commanders with different roles in the field. The federal troops are placed under the 
direct control of USNORTHCOM and they have operational control. This assumes that 
the federal troops are ready to deploy and on standby with all needed equipment. This 
parallel command assumes as well that the National Guard is already in the theatre of 
operations performing their role. The downside to this type of command is the 
complexity it adds to an already difficult situation.48 Figure 3 shows the chain of 
command is structured in this type of environment: 
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Figure 3.  Parallel Command and Control Diagram49  
In addition to the complexity this type of command adds to the AOR (Area of 
Operations), JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, emphasizes that the 
use of a parallel command structure should be avoided if possible because of the absence 
of a single commander.50 
The most preferred type of command in the joint operational realm of HADR is 
the dual-status command. 51The dual-status command structure combines the advantages 
of the state command option and the parallel command option. The dual-status command 
structure addresses the unity of command dilemma directly. Under this, National Guard 
commanders on Title 32 status are ordered to federal active duty (Title 10 status), 
                                                 




retaining their state commission when activated. This dual-status provides the statutory 
authority for one person to command both state and federal military forces 
simultaneously. This permits the dual-hatted commander to control a unified military 
response at the operational level in support of the state. In Figure 4, a notional dual-status 
command illustrates the chain of command beginning with the president and governor:  
 
Figure 4.  Dual-Status Command and Control Diagram52  
National Guard forces in state Active-duty or Title 32 status perform state 
missions under the authority of the governor, and assigned Title 10 Federal forces 
perform defense support of civil authority for USNORTHCOM.53 The advantages of the 
dual-status command include the governor retaining authority over the response, clear 
lines of command, and the ability to integrate Federal military forces operationally to 
achieve unity of effort. Conversely, presidential command and control is preserved. 
Additionally, it promotes the control of information, timely decision-making, 
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synchronization, interoperability, and situational awareness for both state and federal 
forces.  
Another advantage of the dual-status command is that it has the ability to execute 
interstate operations with assigned Title 10 forces. This is possible because a dual-status 
commander with Title 10 authority can operationally direct Title 10 assigned forces 
regionally. Disasters, such as an earthquake along the New Madrid fault line, which 
would affect multiple Midwestern states, could be effectively managed with dual-status 
commands located in each state with assigned federal military forces. The operational 
ability to direct federal forces to wherever they are most needed regionally would reduce 
current interstate gaps and improve the application of military capability. The 
disadvantages include the complexity of the present request process for dual-status 
approval, the potential for conflicting strategic level guidance, and separation of the legal 
lines of operation. For a dual-status command to be established, a commander must be 
authorized by the president and consented to by the governor.  
Finally, a dual-status command risks utilizing state and federal forces in 
operations prohibited by law. An example of this would be federal forces performing law 
enforcement activities. However, this was not without issues. According to the Executive 
Office of the President, at the strategic and operational level, “lack of integrated 
command structure for both active duty and National Guard forces exacerbated 
communications and coordination issues during initial responses.”54  
It is what private companies have, and in some cases, don’t have that makes them 
better prepared for disasters. The two companies that this section will focus on are Wal-
Mart and Home Depot. According to Karen Spens and Karn Budhiraj, there are nine 
categories that these two companies used in order to be ready and excel during times of 
disaster. These are also seen in Figure 5.55 
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Figure 5.  Private Companies Checklist56  
These categories allowed Wal-Mart and Home Depot to be ready for any disaster 
that may occur. Companies that are effective at disaster response have pre-existing plans 
that are immediately executed without any confusion or delay. Even though that most of 
these companies do not have an existing operational chain of command, the plans that 
have been devised for disasters address the chain of command that will develop without 
ambiguity. These plans also incorporate protocols that need to be followed when 
interacting with their partner companies. This ensures that the communication will be 
perfect and that there will be no doubling up of efforts without the other company 
knowing about it.57  
Another advantage of the private sector is the effective stockpiling of goods and 
perishables in case of a disaster. These companies analyzed the product and service mix 
and predicted what items would be in high demand and proactively worked to stockpile 
these items.58 The largest advantages these companies had over the federal government 
was the ability to maintain standing partnerships with other companies and effectively 
communicate with these companies to ensure they were ready to go at a moment’s notice. 
The Home Depot worked with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Red Cross, and the 
                                                 




Salvation Army in order to effectively distribute the goods and services needed during 
the disasters.59 This allowed relief that to be applied and distributed to the people who 
needed it. Finally, the private sector knows how to liaison with local employees and local 
residents to find out what the best way to accomplish a task it. These tasks could range 
from search and rescue to finding out what the best way to get aid into area is. The ability 
to take the advice from local people is what makes these companies so successful at 
disaster relief.  
Private companies that make the arrangements to involve themselves into the 
HADR realm range all over from telecommunication firms to food and beverage 
companies. The American public might be skeptical that a chain of command could form 
across all of these types of companies and effectively fight a disaster. However, this is 
where the Humanitarian Relief Initiative (HRI) from the World Economic Forum molds 
the roles of each of these companies.60 Once a company states they wish to be a part of 
the HADR model, the forum takes the information and the services that can be rendered 
and places them into a category of business. When a disaster happens, they are activated 
and their job is to begin working to restore the service they provide. The ability to 
activate private companies to restore specific services during a disaster can often be the 
difference between a failed and successful outcome. It is this ability to form a chain of 
command, adaptability, and knowing precisely what the company’s role is in HADR that 
makes the private sector a very clear choice for all aspects of disaster relief. 
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IV. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS 
The use of the military during a disaster zone is primarily to maintain order within 
the affected area. The authorities of the military during this time are outlined in the Posse 
Comitatus act and the Insurrection Act. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits federal troops 
from engaging in law enforcement with the civilian authorities. However, the act does 
allow federal troops to engage in: 
 Protect the People from Violence. “The direct violence of the attacks and 
disasters is likely to be compounded by violence provoked by them. Law 
enforcement agencies have the duty to protect the people from the effects 
of this violence. The role of the federal troops in situations requiring their 
use to enforce the laws is to assist police and National Guard forces to 
quell riots, prevent looting, and provide security. To protect the people, 
federal troops will have to stop, search, apprehend, and detain looters and 
rioters, sometimes in direct support of police officers but sometimes 
not.”61 
 Protect Key Facilities. “Federal troops, civilian and contractor police 
officers are responsible for protecting DOD facilities and civil facilities 
deemed essential for the accomplishment of DOD’s expeditionary 
missions, or to the well-being of the nation.”62  
 Control Mass Movement of People. “Emergencies often involve planned 
or spontaneous movement of people as they seek to avoid danger. In 
catastrophic emergencies, these movements will be very large and will be 
beyond the capability of law enforcement agencies to control. In these 
events, federal military forces will assist in the planning, preparation, 
conduct, and enforcement of evacuations, quarantines, and stay in place 
policies. In doing this, federal troops will be enforcing the laws.”63 
 Provide Essential Supplies and Services to the People. “Victims of 
emergencies need food and water, medical care, and other essential 
supplies and services to mitigate the consequences of the emergency. 
When an emergency is of such a large size, scope, or duration as to exceed 
the capabilities of the normal providers, federal troops can provide 
emergency supplies, services, transportation, and logistical management 
capabilities to meet the urgent needs of the people. Delivery of emergency 
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support and services may involve enforcing the law to assure equitable 
distribution of goods and services.”64 
 Augment the Capabilities of Civil Organizations. “Because of its 
readiness to wage war overseas, DOD has greater capabilities in some 
technical aspects of homeland security than most civil organizations, 
particularly local and state agencies. These capabilities are in chemical 
weapons, biological warfare agents, and (along with the Department of 
Energy (DOE)) nuclear weapons and radiation. DOD also has highly 
developed abilities with respect to command and control, intelligence, and 
communications. DOD can enhance management of terrorist attacks by 
making its technical capabilities available to local agencies.”65 
Due to the restrictions placed on Federal troops during a disaster relief scenario, 
the above allowable missions alleviate pressure on the local law enforcement allowing 
them to do their jobs more effectively.  
A. WHAT ARE THE PRIVATE ENTITIES ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH? 
Recent storms, such as Hurricane Sandy that devastated the East Coast, allowed 
the involvement of private companies possible due to the immediate response. Beyond 
the ability to respond quickly, the reserves of supplies that are stockpiled is critical to the 
survivability of the people that are trapped in the disaster zone. When a disaster strikes it 
affects a town, city, or states as a whole, however, much of the damage that occurs is on 
an individual level. This is where private companies are able to make a lot of difference. 
People who have been stranded in an area often need water, food, shelter and medical 
care before the federal government can get it to them. After Hurricane Katrina’s 
aftermath had cleared up to an acceptable level, Phillip Capitano, mayor of the New 
Orleans suburb of Kenner stated, “The only lifeline in Kenner was the Wal-Mart stores. 
We didn’t have looting on a mass scale because Wal-Mart showed up with food and 
water so our people could survive.”66 Many private companies are ready to assist in a 
disaster relief situation, but in certain cases, such as Katrina, the federal government 
interrupts the communications and the logistics that these companies can provide.  
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Again, time is the largest factor in the difference between life and death in most of 
these catastrophic situations. Private companies, such as DRADT (Disaster Relief and 
Disaster Training), are able to provide vehicles that arrive on the scene of a disaster 
within hours after it happens, including the DR1, DR2, and the EMOC. 
 
Figure 6.  DR1  
DR1 is an 83 foot part Truck and Trailer that houses sleeping quarters, 
office space and a full functioning maintenance bay and storage unit for 
our equipment and the supplies that we bring to bear during our response 
to a disaster. It also houses DR1.5, an all-wheel drive side-by-side Polaris 
that allows us to get personnel and equipment in and out of areas where 
debris restricts access to larger vehicles.67 
  
                                                 










Figure 7.  FDR2 
Provided by the Scott McRae Group and Duval Ford, DR2 is a fully 
equipped Ford F250 designed and equipped for the immediate response to 
a disaster. It serves as both a scout and support vehicle in disaster areas, 
going ahead of DR1 because of its much smaller size. It also has the 
personnel and equipment that allows us to make an immediate impact 
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Figure 8.  Emergency Mobile Operations Center 
Emergency Mobile Operations Center (EMOC) was a Military Field 
Hospital in Afghanistan in its former life. It consists of two 25ft x 26ft 
tents, a 18ft x 25ft tent and a 14ft x 25ft tent. This allows us to set up a 
physical base of operations in a disaster anywhere and at any time. Its 
modular design allows us the flexibility to use them as a mobile command 
center, a volunteer processing and staging area, a field hospital or a 
temporary housing shelter. It includes a 45kw generator capable of 
providing power for our operations and an entire neighborhood or our 
local partnering organization.69 
This company is just one of many companies in the private world to help people 
in need during a disaster situation. With the help of these companies and what they bring 
to the fight, the federal government has the resources that they need in order to be 
successful in the disaster relief realm.  
B. WHAT DO THE PRIVATE COMPANIES HAVE TO GAIN FROM 
JOINING THE DISASTER RELIEF EFFORT? 
The involvement of private companies in HADR can provide considerable 
support to the public sector. However, what does the private sector receive in return? 
What incentives do private companies have to enter a disaster zone? 
Private companies enter a disaster zone principally because of profits. Profits play 
a major role in why private companies are eager to enter the disaster relief realm. What 
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makes this a powerful force is when a for-profit company leaves an area during a disaster, 
they may lose future profits and/or market opportunities.70 This profit driven assistance 
creates a very effective response mechanism and allows the private companies to research 
an area and derive what the people in the affected area are most likely to need. This 
response and focused driven aid builds consumer loyalty in an affected market that brings 
more profits to the companies. 
However, other reasons they enter a disaster zone is: private companies receive 
public recognition and project related “branding.”71 To this end, companies in the HADR 
realm often give one-time cash contributions to engage NGOs. These one-time cash 
contributions are the simplest way for corporations to engage in the HADR realm due to 
the flexibility and speed it can be used with.72 This puts the contributing companies 
names in the face of the American and international public. Another major driving force, 
is that the cash contributions and the assistance places pressure on humanitarian 
organizations to improve accountability standards.73 The “feel good” mentality also plays 
a part in the engagement of corporate entities in the disaster area. Companies are 
pressured by their employees because it is “the right thing to do.”74 According to CSIS,  
Immediate corporate giving is often emotion laden, with staff pressuring 
their employers to do something in the immediate wake of a disaster. For 
this reason, companies highly value the “feel good” factor associated with 
participation in life-saving relief activities as opposed to longer-term 
recovery. That said, companies are increasingly being advised to hold 
back funding for recovery needs, and a growing number of businesses 
recognize the value of later contributions for sustainable recovery.75  
Another benefit these private companies have in helping to organize relief efforts 
are the partnerships that are developed between the local and federal companies in the 
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area. This creates an incentive for the private companies to contribute not only cash, but 
also resources.76 
Even though the public may benefit from contributions made by private 
companies, the question remains, are there unintended consequences? Some journalists 
believe that there could be possible unfair distribution of resources, falsifying information 
to maintain public relations, and price gouging so only the super wealthy could afford it. 
According to the Center for Strategic & International Studies, the contributions of the 
private sector are sometimes wildly exaggerated in order to manage the public 
expectations in the companies for the next disaster.77 Journalists, such as Chan Lowe, 
believe that the use of private companies in HADR would serve only the wealthy. He 
states:  
There would be a consortium of companies. Who would run it? Would 
precious resources be directed to wealthier communities that could pay 
cash on the barrelhead, leaving those more devastated, but poorer, to fend 
for themselves? Would market forces take over, where prices charged 
would reflect the desperation of customers?78 
However, the USAID Global Development Alliances and other partnerships that 
are involved in the disaster relief realm, through individualized memorandums of 
understanding and statutory mandates control these fears.79 The companies that are 
involved in HADR look to share this information to the public so they have the 
knowledge of what to expect from them and where this money and relief aid is going. 
Figure 9 and 10 indicate what the private companies gave to various causes and what 
categories they contributed to. 
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Figure 9.  Comparison of U.S. Corporate and U.S. Government Giving for Relief of 
International Disasters, Given in Millions of Dollars80 
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Figure 10.  Corporate Giving by Focus Areas, 2009 and 2010 (Percent) Domestic and 
International, Given in Millions of Dollars81 
Private companies that are involved in HADR give millions of dollars in aid to 
disaster struck areas and spend millions more to help prepare and mitigate situations in 
these disasters. Because of the incentives that draw companies into the realm of HADR, 
they are able to focus on the individual communities societies that may be in the path of a 
disaster and study what resources those people may need most.  
C. HOW CAN THE MILITARY/FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WORK 
TOGETHER AND CAN THEY CO-EXIST IN THE DPR REALM? 
A significant number of private companies during Hurricane Katrina were on 
hand to provide the basic essentials to the stranded citizens after the storm but were either 
turned away or were sent someplace else due to FEMA taking over the relief efforts. The 
current director of FEMA, Craig Fugate praised the private sector for “this incredible 
restorative function of businesses.”82 In fact, he frequently cites a story about how FEMA 
was spending a lot of money to ship ice to a community, only to learn that the local 
grocery store already had ice on hand. As he reasoned, the more business could take care 
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of everyday needs, the more FEMA could devote its resources to more critical situations. 
In short, ordinary functioning of business was an extraordinary help to the disaster 
response process.83  
Officials in both local and federal government recognize “collaboration with local 
agencies can increase the effectiveness of collaboration, not only because of increased 
interaction with the emergency management community, but because of the relationships 
of local organizations with members of the community.”84  
Conversely, some believe that having the private companies attempt to assist in 
disaster relief would be nothing but a waste of time and a lesson in chaos. Other critics, 
such as the Partnerships for Emergency Preparedness: Developing Partnerships, allude 
to the fact that the public-safety and private sectors have conducted exercises independent 
of one another and that few of them understand the others’ roles in emergency 
prevention, preparedness, response and recovery creating a major and sometimes 
impossible divide to overcome between the two entities.85  
A joint partnership between the military and private companies would be a benefit 
to the United States. The literature shows that even though there is some skepticism that 
this kind of partnership would work due to the challenges in command, prices of 
contributions, and possible PCA violations, there is very little literature that argues why 
the private sector and the military cannot work together. The PCA and the Stafford Act 
already accommodates some role for the private sector in HADR. Both the law and the 
practice of disaster relief could change to allow a bigger, more proactive, and more 
coordinate role for private companies. If the private companies work alongside the 
military during disaster relief then the United States would see a more efficient and able 
disaster response force. 
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V. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 This chapter will only focus on the legal issues surrounding the PCA and the 
Stafford Act. Many government officials view the PCA as necessary within the 
government since it prohibits the president from employing federal troops for a law 
enforcement role. This prohibition was sought to stop the president from using federal 
troops for personal gain, such as rigging elections or forcing decisions based on coercion 
from troops. This act however does not prohibit the president from using federal troops 
for the disaster relief process. Under the Stafford Act, the governor of a state may ask the 
president to send federal troops to a disaster area to perform “emergency work.” But this 
does not include the ability to perform law enforcement duties. This chapter will examine 
the PCA and argue that it should be amended to allow federal troops to participate in law 
enforcement activities. It will also argue that the Stafford Act should be expanded to 
include emergency work, including law enforcement in a potentially fragile area. 
A. POSSE COMITATUS ACT 
A number of legal issues surround the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA)86 in a disaster zone. 
The PCA does not allow the involvement of military investigators to assist civilian police 
forces and does not allow the military to “pervade the activities” of civilian officials.87  
The Insurrection Act (2006) allows the President to order military troops into an 
area to restore law and order in the case of revolution or civil unrest.88 The Insurrection 
Act notes, “President, authorizing him to determine that… insurrection, domestic 
violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy.”89 
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The governor of a state can activate National Guard troops to perform law 
enforcement roles but in the case of civil unrest, however, once those troops are 
federalized under title 10, they no longer have the authority to perform law enforcement 
activities.90 In 2006, the William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal pointed out that a single 
commander in the field needs to have the authority to control both federal and National 
Guard troops to make emergency decisions quickly.91 The idea of a dual-hatted 
commander who can control both local and federal troops is supported from many 
government officials, including the National Guard or in Congress.92 Schumacher states, 
“This centralized command and control construct provides both the federal and state 
chains of command with a common operating picture through the eyes of the DSC (Dual-
Status Commander). It also enables the DSC to maximize his or her federal and state 
capabilities, as well as facilitate unity of effort from all assigned forces.”93 
There are, however, disadvantages by not including the military in law 
enforcement duties within the civilian population. In some cases, such as a pandemic of 
flu or an outbreak of hemorrhagic fever within the United States, one option would be to 
have the military to perform the duties of the civilian law enforcement due to the vast 
resources available and the possibility of widespread panic and rioting occurring.94 Many 
in Congress as well as the current Commander-in-Chief, President Barack Obama, state 
that in the case of an overwhelming incident, where the civilian authorities could not 
handle the situation, the military should be sent in full force to combat the disaster.95 
Many governors argue that having the military engage in law enforcement activities as a 
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major part of the disaster relief process violates the U.S. Constitution and that the role 
should remain with the National Guard.96 
1. Should We Really Amend the Posse Comitatus Act? 
It is argued here that the United States should amend the PCA to allow the use of 
federal troops to assist in law enforcement activities. In the last 20 years, the United 
States saw multiple storms that caused millions of dollars in damage and took thousands 
of lives. In the case of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, when the local police force was called 
on to provide stability to the region, it was found that most of the police force had chosen 
to evacuate the area with their families ahead of time. However, if the PCA was amended 
to reflect a change allowing Title 10 troops to assist in the law enforcement process, the 
restoration process would be streamlined. 
However, the use of federal troops to enforce federal laws is not prohibited by the 
PCA. There are three instances of using federal troops for law enforcement: “ (1) an act 
of Congress expressly authorizes use of part of the Army or Air Force as a Posse 
Comitatus or otherwise to execute the law; (2) the activity in question does not involve 
use of part of the Armed Forces covered by the proscription; or (3) the activity in 
question does not constitute “execution of the law.”“97 Posse Comitatus relies on case 
history to provide examples of violations when citizens believe it has been violated. 
These examples rely on the incident at Wounded Knee on the Pine Ridge Indian 
Reservation. The three criteria that must be met to show the Posse Comitatus Act was 
violated are:  
1. Whether civilian law enforcement officials made a “direct active use” of 
Military investigators to “execute the law.” 
2. Whether the use of the military “pervaded the activities” of the civilian 
Officials. 
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3. Whether the military was used so as to subject “citizens to the exercise 
of Military power which was regulatory, prescriptive, or compulsory in 
nature.98 
This use of military power only applies when it is engaged in completing the duties 
normally assigned to civilian agencies. This does not apply when the military is asked to 
support fighting forest fires or other natural containment issues.99 
If the above examples are taken into consideration about why the act should be 
amended, it can be shown that if the general public is in a situation where anarchy has 
taken over, such as in the Hurricane Katrina example, the military would be the last line 
of defense against such action. If victims had to wait until there was a declaration from 
Congress, this would sacrifice much needed time in the process of restoring order. The 
PCA should be amended to allow the use of Title 10 troops in extenuating circumstances 
during a disaster relief situation where the local law enforcement is either gone or so 
undermanned that they cannot perform their duties without endangering themselves and 
the people they swore to protect. This type of amendment to the act would alleviate the 
issues of lawlessness and instability by using Title 10 troops in the beginning of a disaster 
relief effort. 
B. THE STAFFORD ACT 
The Stafford Act, created in 1988, amended the Disaster Relief Act of 1974. This 
act allows the governor of a state to declare a state of emergency and to ask the President 
of the United States for assistance in the form of title 10 troops.100 The president may 
then provide troops to the requesting state for a maximum of ten days in order to perform 
the emergency work needed.101 This emergency work is defined as “clearance and 
removal of debris and wreckage and temporary restoration of essential public facilities 
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and services.”102 Therefore, even though the military may be called in to perform this 
emergency work, the military still cannot perform law enforcement duties under this act.  
When dealing with private companies during a disaster, the Stafford Act states 
that any contract given to a private company shall be with a local company. The Act 
states: “In the expenditure of Federal funds for debris clearance, distribution of supplies, 
reconstruction, and other major disaster or emergency assistance activities that may be 
carried out by contract or agreement with private organizations, firms, or individuals, 
preference shall be given, to the extent feasible and practicable, to those organizations, 
firms, and individuals residing or doing business primarily in the area affected by such 
major disaster or emergency.”103 This passage shows that even though private businesses 
may enter into the disaster relief realm to provide assistance, no clause allows private 
companies to assist before the disaster strikes or immediately after. The Act shows that 
the federal government may pay private companies to perform work, but not actually 
provide relief alongside the military making the integration of the private sector difficult. 
2. What Does the Stafford Act Allow? 
The Stafford Act allows certain actions to be taken by the government prior, 
during and after an event. DHS is allowed to preposition assets on the ground and to 
request other federal agencies establish an Emergency Operations Center (EOC), assess 
any major incidents, seek additional resources from the city, state or tribe, mobilize state 
resources to combat the disaster and mobilize a Preliminary Damage Assessment team 
(PDA) to assess the initial damage. Based upon the assessment of the team, the governor 
can request the president to declare an emergency in the affected areas. Below is a 
illustration that summarizes the actions that are taken in the event of an emergency:104 
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Figure 11.  Actions Taken in Event of Emergency105  
The Stafford Act allows local governments to call on the U.S. Government to 
provide Title 10 troops in order to provide emergency preparedness and assist in the 
aftermath by utilizing resources to maintain the infrastructure of a city or a town. Nothing 
in the act allows the federal military to engage in law enforcement activities among the 
civilian population. 
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VI. WHAT TO DO ABOUT DISASTER RELIEF IN THE FUTURE? 
After Hurricane Katrina struck the US, the aftermath showed the federal 
government that there were major problems with the plans they had made to combat 
disasters of such magnitude. Once these problems were identified, both private 
companies and the government moved to fix these issues and make the response plans 
more effective.  
There still is room for improvement within the system when it comes to local 
responders and the readiness at local and state level. A major issue that is still debated is 
whether or not the federal military should be used for enforcing the local laws in order to 
protect the local population and alleviate the pressure on local police force.  
This chapter will focus on the future of disaster relief and how it can be improved 
in many ways from the local, state, and federal level. 
A. PRIVATE COMPANIES CONTRIBUTING TO THE FIGHT AGAINST 
DISASTER 
The major issues that private companies face in the fight to prepare for the next 
natural disaster are how to create and maintain a plan that will allow companies not only 
respond quickly to a natural disaster but also how to maintain that posture to provide a 
sustainable structure that can last for a long period of time while the military conducts 
their operations in the disaster zone. According to the World Economic Forum, they have 
started the process to the Engineering and Construction Disaster Resource Partnership 
(DPR). This is a new model for a coordinated private sector partnership to respond to 
natural disasters.106  
The vision of the DRP according to the forum is to, “form an ongoing 
collaboration with the humanitarian community at the global level, and government and 
other key humanitarian actors at the national level, to optimize the core strengths and 
capacities of the E&C (Engineering and Construction) community before, during and 
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after natural rapid-onset disasters”107 and “Construction companies located in disaster-
affected areas have assets that can be invaluable to humanitarian and government relief 
organizations. These can be tangible assets, including stockpiled food, water and shelter 
materials (such as tarpaulins, timber, scaffolding, galvanized sheeting and sand 
bags)...construction sites.”108 By creating relationships among government and other 
Non-Government Organizations (NGO) along with Non-Profit Organizations (NPO), a 
new type of private sector disaster response is being created.  
David Miller, the associate administrator for the Federal Insurance and Mitigation 
Administration of the FEMA states that, the federal government can focus more on 
disaster preparedness rather on response. He states, “Too often mitigation is viewed as a 
recovery function. Part of the challenge is to go back and look at it as an investment 
against future disasters. Ultimately, it gets down to a mentality of “You can pay me now 
or you can pay me later.” And if you pay me later, it will cost you a lot more than if you 
invest prudently now.”109 This type of “why spend money now on infrastructure and take 
a loss of profit when the government whether it be local or federal government, can cut 
corners and save money” attitude seems to make sense, but when a major disaster 
happens where MAJOR repairs to the infrastructure happens, the government then has to 
pay out more money than it would have to before.  
Finally, Peter J Denning of Naval Postgraduate School found that a partnership that is 
formed in times of emergency called a “near-instant collaboration” is still a private-public 
venture that can last even after an emergency is over.110 This attitude about fixing things 
when they break and not before needs to change. This reaction can cost billions of dollars 
rather than millions. Also, the relationships that are formed whether they are overnight or 
over time with a lot of cooperation are crucial to the future of private companies having a 
major role and impact in the disaster relief realm. 
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B. FUNDING PREPARATION TO PROVIDE MORE ECONOMICALLY 
SOUND RELIEF EFFORTS 
As of now funding for disaster relief comes from many different funds, such as 
the President’s Disaster Relief Fund and FEMA. The difficulty comes when funding such 
programs need to find the money due to other programs in the chain takes precedence 
over disaster relief and support. Funding for disaster relief needs to come from private 
companies that already make preparations and stockpile supplies as well as new 
government funds that money would be set aside for. This would make sure that during 
the aftermath of a disaster funding would not have to be pulled to pay for repairs to the 
infrastructure that could have been avoided in the first place if the preparations and the 
funding is made available. 
In 2013, Congress passed the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act that authorized 
50.7 billion dollars in disaster assistance. This fund was placed into effect to mitigate the 
damages from future disasters in the impacted region.111 According to the FY2013 
supplemental funding for disaster relief stated, “The disaster relief allowable adjustment 
for FY2013 is $11.8 billion. Under the current continuing resolution, the amount of 
disaster relief that would be provided under the Budget Control Act (BCA) if the 
Continuing Resolution (CR) extended for the year was $6.4 billion. The Administration 
proposed using the remainder of the allowable adjustment for disaster relief in its 
supplemental request, and using an emergency funding designation to ensure the 
remaining resources provided through the request do not count against the FY2013 
budget caps.” This budget for disaster relief is very good in practice, but as stated above, 
it is all based on a continuing resolution that means once the government encounters 
issues with the budget the funding from the disaster relief fund will be cut and reassigned. 
There has to be a permanent fund in order for disaster relief to maintain a reliable level of 
readiness.  
                                                 
111 William Painter and Jared Brown, FY2013 Supplemental Funding for Disaster Relief, CRS Report 
R42869 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, February 19, 2013), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42869.pdf. 
 48 
Even though funding for disaster relief exists, there are many other private funds 
that contribute much more to the readiness of disaster relief. The governments needs to 
liaison with private companies that are engaged in disaster relief but also set up a 
permanent funding program that cannot be pulled from in the case of a continuing 
resolution or to fund other operations whether overseas or domestically. This new way of 
thinking would allow disaster relief organization the resources they need to conduct the 
operations that is requested of them. 
C. FEMA TAKING A LEAD IN THE PROCESS OF DISASTER RELIEF 
Many agencies within the government believe that the local and state 
governments need to depend on themselves in order to prepare disaster relief. This is true 
to a point. Local and state government need to understand what types of natural disasters 
could affect them and make the proper preparations to combat the event before, during 
and after it occurs. However, many municipalities within the state do not have the 
resources or training to prepare for disasters. This is where the federal government, 
mainly FEMA, comes into the picture and provides the training needed in order to make 
the local and state levels ready for disaster. Appendix C shows what the federal 
governments responsibilities are during a federal disaster.112 
Unfortunately, this image shows the lack of a “prepare, train and deploy” 
category. This is the kind of involvement FEMA needs to show in order to regain the 
momentum it lost during Hurricane Katrina as the premier disaster response agency in the 
United States.  
Many times, local and state governments do not have the resources or experience 
to conduct the type of operations and training that is needed in order to maintain the 
readiness of the local government. The federal government at the level of FEMA has the 
resources to conduct and train the local population of a state ready to combat a natural 
disaster. FEMA is supposedly the foremost authority on disaster relief. The agency 
should be coming up with new and innovative ideas and ways to train people around the 
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nation in disaster relief in order to combat the natural disasters that devastate the US 
every year. FEMA can no longer afford to waste the tax dollars that are given to them by 
designing vehicles that have no use in the urban environment, such as the vehicles that 
are similar to the MRAPs the Marine Corps uses. These vehicles cannot properly 
maneuver in close urban environments. 
The training plans need to have real world applicability, such as what first 
responders need to accomplish within the first 24-48 hours so that FEMA can gather 
resources to deploy to the disaster zone. Finally, FEMA MUST stop looking at disaster 
relief as a bottom-up problem. Disaster relief needs to be looked at as a bottom-up top-
bottom process where while the local governments and first responders are organizing 
and executing their missions, the federal government and FEMA are ALSO deploying, 
supplying, and conducting joint relief missions alongside the local government. This type 
of response will allow the government to respond more efficiently due to the local 
knowledge that will come with the local government involved, save money by not 
wasting resources by deploying useless items to an area that they cannot operate in, and it 
will save precious time and lives. This is the role FEMA needs to take in the future when 
it comes to disaster relief and preparing and executing a mission. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Throughout this thesis, it has shown multiple points about disaster relief and the 
private-public relationship of disaster relief. It has also shown how when the government 
fails to provide the aid and relief that is needed, the local government and the private 
entities are able to supply those basic needs before the federal government.  
During and after Hurricane Katrina, the federal government had created a plan 
called the NRP that at the time seemed to address the issues that the government believed 
to cause the largest concerns. However, it is seen throughout the thesis that the proper 
preparations were not made and the federal government did not plan for the type and 
magnitude of disaster that occurred. As the storm’s aftermath began to show how intense 
the devastation was, the federal government was called on by the state of Louisiana to 
provide the aid that was needed. However, because of chain of command issues from the 
state level to the federal level, that aid that had been made ready weeks before was almost 
three days late. 
In most Americans’ minds, the National Guard is made up of individuals who are 
ready to answer the call to ANY disaster in the United States. What happens when those 
individuals are not there to answer the call because they were sent someplace else and not 
able to assist? This was the issue in Katrina. When Governor Blanco called on the 
National Guard of Louisiana, most of them had been activated from Title 32 to Title 10 
active duty federal troops to fight the war in Iraq and Afghanistan leaving New Orleans 
without the compliment of guardsmen to help combat the disaster. 
Throughout this paper, it has shown that FEMA during this disaster was not 
prepared for this type of disaster, and when it occurred, FEMA wanted to be the main 
agency to lead the relief effort but to have all decisions have to go through them. In 
hindsight this behavior should have been noticed before since the director of FEMA at 
the time Michael Brown, had zero experience in the disaster relief realm and had no idea 
what it was going to take to make FEMA disaster ready. Because of this lack of response 
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from the federal government and from FEMA, it brought private companies and what 
they bring to the fight and what role should the military have to the table. 
As seen in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the local law enforcement who 
were charged with maintaining order in New Orleans either left, were killed, or 
abandoned their posts and joined in on the massive looting during the aftermath. In an 
attempt to take back control of the city, the remaining police force tried to implement 
marshal law of sorts in order to control what they could. Unfortunately, this effort led to 
major civil rights abuses, constitutional rights violations, and in the end vigilantism since 
the citizens who were still in their homes could not count on the police to defend them. 
This placed the idea of using the federal military for law enforcement activities in the 
spotlight. 
Many people were arguing for the use of the military but then there were others 
on the other side arguing that once the military is used for law enforcement, then the 
government would be tempted to use the military for everyday problems. However, the 
Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of federal (Title 10) troops for law enforcement 
with very limited exceptions under the Insurrection Act. The research has led to the 
conclusion that the amendment of Posse Comitatus Act in certain and limited situations is 
needed in order to use Title 10 troops for law enforcement in order to maintain order 
within an area and to preserve human life. 
The military possesses many good qualities and can be used effectively in many 
situations; the disaster relief realm is not one of them. As National Guard Colonel 
Kenneth E. Ring stated, “the Army lacks a clear, effective, and coordinated response 
capability.”113 This statement shows that when it comes to disaster relief, they are no 
good as first responders because they do not have the ability to communicate effectively 
within their own organization. It is not a question of whether the military should be 
engaged in humanitarian relief, but how. In one of the chapters, it is shown that the 
military should no longer be in charge of logistics due to the slow response time and the 
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confusion and complexity because of the chain of command, but to leave this to the 
private companies that deal with customer service everyday all day everyday. 
Communications in a disaster area should be left to the companies that are required by 
their customers to provide a reliable network to establish contact. 
This is not to say the military should not be involved, but they should only be 
involved when it comes to search and rescue, delivery of goods, and medical support. 
The military has many other issues that prohibit them from delivering a viable and 
sustainable disaster relief product. The biggest issue is the ever-extensive chain of 
command. Because of the length the chain of command and the complexity, the military 
is not able to make decisions on the ground and then report back to the higher superiors. 
If the military wants to make a decision about an issue, they have to report to higher who 
then must ask their superiors and then deliver a decision back down, which takes too 
much time and by the time it reaches the commander in the field, it is already too late to 
make any good progress. 
The private companies do not have to accomplish this. They operate with no chain 
of command at the operational level and they have a plan of EXACTLY who is in charge 
on the ground during a disaster, not to mention these companies are under an agency in 
the private sector who establishes exactly what certain companies are going to provide 
that enables quick and rapid response with no confusion or overlap of resources. It is the 
disassociated chain of command of the private companies and the extreme complexity 
and slow response of decisions from the federal chain of commands that make the 
military a bad choice to lead a relief operation and makes the private companies the best 
choice to become the first responders and leaders in these types of situations. 
While some apocalypse scenarios may seem improbable or even unreal, at least 
one of these fictional situations is being applied to real-life disaster preparedness.114 As 
seen in Appendix A, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention tapped the ongoing 
pop-culture interest in zombies for a health crisis promotion. While the zombie 
apocalypse is a fictional creation, its attendant make-believe scenarios bring an 
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undeniable parallel to disaster relief in the United States. As depicted in popular culture, 
zombies consume everything and everyone in their path, infecting water supplies, 
destroying crops and food sources, and infesting buildings.  Presenting a view of disaster 
relief through the eyes of a lone survivor in an imagined zombie apocalypse gives 
organizations like the Center for Disease Control and Human Health and Services a 
creative way to interest people in disaster preparedness and survival.  
In a zombie apocalypse, or any natural disaster that has caused major damage to 
the infrastructure of any local government, the military is hindered by to the lack of 
communications, proper equipment, the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act, and the 
massive complexity of the chains of command of Title 10 and Title 32 troops in the field. 
When it comes to first response in the disaster relief realm, private companies with their 
chain of command at the operation level and ability to make decisions in the field without 
having to seek approval, are better equipped to deal with major logistic, communication, 
and supply availability problems in the immediate aftermath of a major disaster.  
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APPENDIX A. CAN THE POPULAR CULTURE OF ZOMBIES 
IMPROVE THE OVERALL RESPONSE OF DISASTER RELIEF? 
Ever since popular science fiction director George Romero made and released the 
film “Night of the Living Dead,”115 people have become fascinated with zombies. 
Zombies are thought to be the “worst-case” scenario. This fascination has led to the 
development of multiple groups, such as the Zombie Research Society and Zombie 
Response Team, which help people prepare for the zombie apocalypse. Not all of these 
entities are private organizations; the federal government, too, has been capitalizing on 
the zombie craze. These organizations include FEMA, HHS (Human Health and 
Services), and the CDC (Center for Disease Control). The federal government and private 
companies are using the zombie apocalypse theme to motivate people in disaster 
preparedness.  
So, can the pop culture of zombies improve the overall response of disaster relief? 
A. THE DIRECT CORRELATION BETWEEN ZOMBIES AND DISASTERS 
FEMA and the CDC use zombies as a way to get people interested in preparing 
for a natural disaster. The zombie preparedness lists that the government provides are the 
same lists used for all other natural or man-made disasters. 
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Figure 12.  CDC Zombie Preparedness Poster116 
Currently, the CDC has a portion of its website for teachers to engage their 
students on how to prepare for a natural disaster using the fictional tool of a zombie 
apocalypse. When a natural disaster strikes the United States, the effects can include 
massive structural damage, looting, and in certain cases, such as Hurricane Katrina, 
extreme violence.. Below is a list of some of the items that the CDC recommends for a 
zombie kit in order to survive: 
Assemble the following items to create kits for use at home, the office, 
at school and/or in a vehicle: 
 Water—one gallon per person, per day (3-day supply for evacuation, 
2-week supply for home) 
 Food—non-perishable, easy-to-prepare items (3-day supply for 
evacuation, 2-week supply for home) 
 Flashlight 
 Battery-powered or hand-crank radio (NOAA Weather Radio, if possible) 
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 Extra batteries 
 First aid kit 
 Medications (7-day supply) and medical items 
 Multi-purpose tool 
 Sanitation and personal hygiene items 
 Cell phone with chargers 
 Emergency blanket 
 Map(s) of the area 
 Medical supplies 
 Two-way radios 
 Extra set of car keys and house keys 
 Manual can opener 
 Whistle 
 N95 or surgical masks 
 Matches 
 Rain gear 
 Towels 
 Work gloves 
 Tools/supplies for securing your home 
 Extra clothing, hat and sturdy shoes 
 Plastic sheeting”117 
What is interesting about the list is it is the EXACT same list as the list they 
recommend for tornados, earthquakes, hurricanes and other disasters. The reason the 
CDC put out the Zombie list is people are more interested and willing to listen about 
zombies due to the Hollywood portrayal the events. Founder of the Zombie Research 
Society stated,  
Zombies go hand in hand with disasters since they are the WORST case 
scenario. People running in the streets scared, food being cut off and then 
running out, water running out or becoming contaminated, and shelter 
                                                 
117 Center for Disease Control, “Emergency Preparedness and Response.”  
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being a gamble on whether it is safe or not. People can learn a lot about 
survival in a disaster situation from zombies and how they would act and 
where they would go. 
These situations emphasize how to survive as an individual, and how the federal and 
private responders should prepare for a disaster situation. 
B. MUCH DIFFERENT ROLE FOR THE MILITARY DURING AN 
OUTBREAK 
If there were an outbreak that caused the dead to come back to life within the 
United States, the U.S. military would have a much different role than they would in a 
natural disaster. They would have to engage in law enforcement in order to keep the 
people safe, but then they would have to shift their focus to putting down the Zombie 
threat by any means needed. This realization plays a very important role in the 
development of plans to amend the Posse Comitatus Act to allow the military to 
participate in law enforcement with civilian entities. 
The military would be expected to assist with the evacuation of people from the 
affected area and then the sanitation of the area due to the local forces would be overrun 
and rendered ineffective. Obviously, the military in natural disasters would not conduct 
sanitation of citizens within the affected area, however they would possibly be called on 
in an extreme circumstance under the Insurrection Act to quell riots, engage in law 
enforcement and enact marshal law. These are in the most extreme cases however. The 
image below shows the United States from space at night.118 
                                                 




Figure 13.  Population Map of United States119 
The most densely populated areas would become the most difficult for the 
military to control during both an outbreak and a natural disaster. James F. Miskel, a 
former National Security Council member and professor of National Security Affairs at 
the Naval War College, wrote in Disaster Response and Homeland Security: 
the government typically deals with past failures by adopting a narrow 
focus on specific problems, and generating targeted solutions. However, 
because no two catastrophes are ever the same, a new and unforeseen 
failure is always just waiting right around the corner. In fact, this ‘fine 
tuning’ approach, coupled with a highly interdependent agency structure, 
practically guarantees that we won’t be ready for the next surprise.120  
If the government and federal military is not prepared to deal with the next big 
hurricane, or earthquake, or terrorist attack, how then can we expect anything but 
confusion, communication gaps, and systemic breakdown when facing something as 
                                                 
119 Zombie Research Society, “Zombie North America.” 
120 James F. Miskel, Disaster Response and Homeland Security: What Works and What Doesn’t, 1st 
ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008). 
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horrific as a zombie outbreak? Simply put, the military does not have the material 
resources and personnel to deal with an outbreak or a massive natural disaster that creates 
an environment that breeds violence and evolves into an every-man-for-himself situation. 
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